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Readings are also avaiable by session. There are no specific readings associated with recitation sections.
Textbook
The main textbook will be:
Gibbons, Robert. Game Theory For Applied Economists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 0691003955.
This is the only required textbook and covers the majority of this course's topics. I recommend that you buy it.
The following two books will also be very useful, especially for the exercises. (You need to solve a lot of problems to learn Game Theory.)
Dutta, Prajit. Strategies and Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. ISBN: 0262041693.
Watson, Joel. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2002. ISBN: 0393976483.
I will also refer to:
Kreps, David. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990. ISBN: 0745007627.
All the lectures will be supplemented with detailed notes as well.
Those who want more advanced treatment should look at:
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 0262061414.
or
Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 0262650401.
These two books are very good but harder than the level at which the course is pitched. Those who need an easier – and longer – exposition of the topics can read:
Dixit, Avinash, and Susan Sekeath. Games of Strategy. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1999, 2004. ISBN: 0393924998.
There have been several textbooks published recently. I encourage you to look at these books for extra problems to solve.
Readings by Session
"G" refers to Gibbons' textbook.
Course Readings.
Lec # 
Topics 
READINGS 
1 
Introduction to Game Theory 

2 
Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Expected Utility Theory; Risk Aversion 
Kreps, Chapters 3.13.3. 
35 
A More Formal Introduction to Games
Extensive Forms and Normal Forms
Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Nash Equilibrium
Applications of Nash Equilibrium 
Extensive Forms and Normal Forms
G, Chapters 1.1A and 2.1A.
Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly
Dominated Strategies
G, Chapter 1.1B.
Nash Equilibrium
G, Chapter 1.1C.
Applications of Nash Equilibrium
G, Chapter 1.2. 
68 
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Analysis of ExtensiveForm Games
Backward Induction
Subgame Perfection
Applications
Bargaining and Negotiations
Forward Induction
Applications 
Analysis of ExtensiveForm Games
G, Chapter 2.1A.
Subgame Perfection
G, Chapter 2.2A.
Applications
G, Chapters 2.2B, 2.2C, 2.2D, 2.1B, and 2.1C.
Bargaining and Negotiations
G, Chapter 2.1D. 
9 
Review 

10 
In Class Midterm Exam 1 

1112 
Repeated Games and Cooperation 
G, Chapter 2.3. 
1314 
Incomplete Information
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Auctions
Applications 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
G, Chapters 3.1A and 3.1C.
Applications
G, Chapter 3.2. 
1516 
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
G, Chapter 4.1.
Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
G, Chapter 4.3B. 
17 
Review 

18 
In Class Midterm Exam 2 

1921 
Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics
Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion
Applications of Signaling
The PrincipalAgent Problem
Applications; Lemons, Efficiency Wages, CreditRationing, PriceDiscrimination 
Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion
G, Chapters 4.2A and 4.4.
Applications of Signaling
G, Chapters 4.2B and 4.2C.
The PrincipalAgent Problem
Kreps, Chapter 17. 
2223 
Global Games 

2425 
Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics 

2627 
Applications and Review
Final Exam 
