Recitations for this course meet for 1 hour each Friday.

Lec # Topics Key Dates
1 Introduction to Game Theory
2 Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty

Expected Utility Theory; Risk Aversion
3-5 A More Formal Introduction to Games

Extensive Forms and Normal Forms

Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies

Nash Equilibrium

Applications of Nash Equilibrium
6-8 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

Analysis of Extensive-Form Games

Backward Induction

Subgame Perfection


Bargaining and Negotiations

Forward Induction

Problem Set 1 due on Lecture 6

Problem Set 2 due two days after Lecture 8
9 Review
10 In Class Midterm Exam 1
11-12 Repeated Games and Cooperation
13-14 Incomplete Information

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium


Problem Set 3 due on Lecture 14
15-16 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
Problem Set 4 due on Lecture 16
17 Review
18 In Class Midterm Exam 2
19-21 Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics

Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion

Applications of Signaling

The Principal-Agent Problem

Applications; Lemons, Efficiency Wages, Credit-Rationing, Price-Discrimination
Problem Set 5 due on Lecture 21
22-23 Global Games
24-25 Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium

Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics
Problem Set 6 due on Lecture 25
26-27 Applications and Review

Final Exam