14.126 Game Theory

Fall 2004

Photograph of a chess set.
A chessboard. (Image courtesy of Daniel Bersak.)

Course Highlights

This course features problem sets in the assignments section and lecture notes.

Course Description

This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.

*Some translations represent previous versions of courses.

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Staff

Instructors:
Prof. Haluk Ergin
Prof. Muhamet Yildiz

Course Meeting Times

Lectures:
Two sessions / week
1.5 hours / session

Recitations:
One session / week
1 hour / session

Level

Graduate

*Translations

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